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COMMENTS
The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Regulation Fair Disclosure: Parity of
Information or Parody of Information?
I. INTRODUCTION
January 29, 2001 - Morgan Stanley, one of the biggest investment
banks advising corporate America, gave a restricted briefing to securities
analysts about managerial changes at the very top.' An article in The
Economist later criticized these restrictions, which extended to journal-
ists and even to shareholders. 2 Morgan Stanley defended the restric-
tions, stating that nothing released in the meeting was "material." 3 The
reporter, however, questioned why an elite group of overworked ana-
lysts would bother to attend a meeting if Morgan Stanley would not
release any material information, and why Morgan Stanley restricted
access if the information was not material.4 Incidents of selective dis-
closure, "haven't escaped our attention" said Stephen Cutler, Deputy
Head of Enforcement for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the disgruntled Economist reporter feels confident that the
SEC will launch an investigation into Morgan Stanley's restricted
briefing.5
Briefings like the one described above are not new to Wall Street;
they have been common practice for many years.6 So why should the
reporter expect an investigation? Morgan Stanley's briefing occurred
just a few months after the SEC's outgoing chairman, Arthur Levitt
spoke these lofty words:
Like that neighborhood with gated entrances and tall fences, moving
I. Farewell, fair disclosure?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 73.
2. Id.
3. Id. Information is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision. TSC Indus. Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). To fulfill the materiality requirement, there must be a
substantial likelihood that a fact "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id.
4. ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 73.
5. Id.
6. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, Opening Statement at
Open Meeting on Regulation Fair Disclosure (Aug. 10, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/
seldisal.htm.
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into the information loop is not always an option for many of
America's small investors, Regulation FD would bring all investors,
regardless of the size of their holdings, into the information loop -
where they belong. To all of America's investors, it's well past time
to say, "Welcome to the neighborhood."7
On August 10, 2000, the SEC voted three to one to adopt Regula-
tion FD and stop selective disclosure.' Regulation FD created a
firestorm of over 6,000 comment letters during its proposal phase.9 The
disclosure rule drew sharp criticism from the securities industry, praise
from consumer groups and individual investors, and nearly divided the
SEC.'
This comment evaluates the regulation through the prevailing the-
ory of efficient capital markets to argue that Regulation FD is unneces-
sary and, although passed to enhance the flow of market information to
all investors, it will decrease market efficiency, increase issuer compli-
ance costs, and provide for a more volatile market that erodes investor
confidence. Part II discusses the SEC's battles against selective disclo-
sure and insider trading that led to the passage of Regulation FD. It
identifies the key changes from the proposal to the final rule, explains
the new regulation, and defines key terms in Regulation FD. Part III
considers the workings of the securities market as articulated in the Effi-
cient Capital Markets Hypothesis and reflects on the need for a specific
rule governing selective disclosure. Part IV addresses the potential pit-
falls and traps the new regulation holds for issuers, even after the
changes from the proposal, and discusses the many ways Regulation FD
may provide for increased private securities litigation. Part V suggests
the possible ramifications of Regulation ED may have on the market.
This comment then concludes with a brief analysis as to why efficient
market operation should prevail in the efficiency versus fairness debate
and explains how the SEC may have created a cure that will harm inves-
tors more than the disease it aims to eradicate.
7. Id.
8. Comm'r Laura S. Unger dissented in the August 10, 2000 vote to adopt Regulation FD.
Disclosure: Selective Disclosure Rule Gains Approval by Divided SEC, BNA SECURrIES LAW
DAILY, Aug. 11, 2000.
9. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair
Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules (Aug. 10, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/
seldsfct.htm.
10. Supra note 8.
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II. PRELUDE To REGULATION FD
A. The SEC's Crusade Against Insider Trading and
Selective Disclosure
Selective disclosure occurs when an issuer discloses material infor-
mation to a select audience, typically a small group of analysts or insti-
tutional investors, before making broad public disclosure by a press
release or a SEC filing.1" Unlike classic insider trading, where the
insider trades based on material nonpublic information in a breach of his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation, selective disclosure
was not specifically prohibited by the federal securities laws."2 The dis-
tinction lies in the fact that tippees (those who receive inside informa-
tion) may not have a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders. 3
Historically, courts have not interpreted the securities laws to impose
liability on those who receive or trade on inside information (tippees)
absent a breach of fiduciary duty. 4 The cases that follow show how the
SEC has attempted to stamp out selective disclosure and insider trading.
The cases illustrate the precedents that led Chairman Levitt and the SEC
to propose and later adopt Regulation FD.
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a finan-
cial printer who handled announcements of takeover attempts and traded
before public announcement.' 5 The Court held that a duty to disclose
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not arise from
mere possession of nonpublic market information.' 6 Chiarella was not
an agent or fiduciary of the sellers. Therefore, he had no duty to dis-
close the information to the sellers before trading. 7
11. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591 (proposed Dec. 28,
1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2001)), at section I) [hereinafter Proposing Release
Comments].
12. Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 339-40 (1979).
The argument has been made, both explicitly and by implication, that the function
of the antifraud rule is to place all exchange transactors on a parity of information
with all others - to deny informational advantages to any person dealing in the
securities market over any other person with whom he deals. Whether or not such
an egalitarian utopia could be achieved, there is good reason to question whether it
should, or whether the antifraud provisions are intended to (or do) go that far.
Certainly they do not explicitly go that far. And nothing in the legislative history
suggest so sweeping a purpose.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1983).
14. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
15. Id. at 236-37.
16. Id. at 235.
17. Id. at 232-33. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reversed judgment on the fiduciary duty
2002]
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Later in Dirks v. SEC, 8 the SEC attempted to extend insider-trad-
ing liability to an analyst who received information from an insider that
an insurance company had vastly overstated its assets. The analyst
investigated the allegations through other company employees and even
tried to have the story published in the Wall Street Journal." While
investigating the company, however, the analyst discussed the informa-
tion with his clients and investors, who sold their holdings in the com-
pany as a result.20 The SEC argued that the insider not only passed the
inside information along to Dirks, but also passed to Dirks a fiduciary
duty to the corporation's shareholders not to disclose the information.2
The Supreme Court rejected the SEC's claim that Dirks inherited any
such duty and reaffirmed that, "[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the
relationship between parties and not merely one's ability to acquire
information because of his position in the market."22 Further, the Court
reiterated its position in Chiarella that "formulation of an absolute equal
information rule should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence
of congressional intent."2 3
The Court did say, however, that tippees must assume an insider's
duty to the shareholders if the information has been made available to
them improperly.4 Thus, the Court determined the insider breaches his
fiduciary duty if the insider personally benefits, either directly or indi-
rectly, from his disclosure." The insider in Dirks did not receive a ben-
efit, and absent a breach by the insider, Dirks could not commit a
derivative breach.2 6
Shortly after the Dirks decision, SEC Commissioner Edward
Fleischman said, "[t]he fact is that the SEC does not accept Dirks.' '2 7
Commissioner Fleischman then referred to a popular quotation in SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb28 stating the company-to-analyst interaction is a "fenc-
ing match conducted on a tightrope"2 9 and added the warning that the
of the printer to his employer because it was not presented below. This may have been a winning
theory.
18. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
19. Id. at 649-50.
20. Id. at 650.
21. Id. at 656.
22. Id. at 657-58.
23. Id. at 658 n.16.
24. Id. at 660.
25. Id. at 662.
26. Id.
27. John C. Coffee Jr., The SEC and the Securities Analyst, N.Y. L.J. May 30, 1991, at 5.
[hereinafter Coffee].
28. 556 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
29. Id. at 9.
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SEC is "trying hard to electrify the tightrope."30 The SEC asserted this
position against Phillip J. Stevens through a very narrow interpretation
of the personal benefit test articulated in Dirks.31
Mr. Stevens was the former CEO and Chairman of Ultrasystems
Corporation.3 2 Ultrasystems missed earnings estimates by a considera-
ble margin one quarter, and an analyst publicly questioned Mr. Stevens's
ability to properly forecast his company's earnings.33 The SEC alleged
that in the following quarter Mr. Stevens selectively disclosed informa-
tion to analysts in an attempt to improve his professional reputation with
analysts, which satisfied the personal benefit test of Dirks.34 Stevens,
without admitting or denying the allegations, entered into a consent
decree. As a result, the SEC's theory that reputation can be used to
establish a personal benefit under Dirks did not undergo judicial
scrutiny.35
The Dirks decision, in the eyes of many scholars, did not support
the SEC's narrow position even though it referred to "reputational bene-
fit" as part of the objective criteria considered in the personal benefit
test.3 6 Specifically, Professor John Coffee points to the sentence in
Dirks immediately following reference to a "reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings," where the Court quotes Professor
Victor Brudney: "The theory.., is that the insider, by giving the infor-
mation out selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipi-
ents for cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for
himself."37 Because Mr. Stevens entered into a consent decree, the facts
in his case were not fully developed, but Professor Coffee lists several
factors that indicate Mr. Stevens could have successfully defended his
actions under the Dirks precedent. 38 The SEC in its attempt to prosecute
Mr. Stevens, however, made its point to issuers and securities industry
professionals that it would give Dirks the narrowest possible reading.
Thus, the legality of selective disclosure and its relationship with
insider trading rested on a consent decree and an uncertain interpretation
of personal benefit. In the absence of a specific duty to disclose, the
30. Coffee, supra note 27, at 5.
31. SEC v. Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813, 1991 SEC Lexis 451 (Mar. 19,
1991).
32. Id. at *1.
33. Id. at *2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *1.
36. Coffee, supra note 27, at 5.
37. Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Infonnational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322, 348 (1979).
38. Coffee, supra note 27, at 5.
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federal securities laws do not require an issuer to publicly disclose all
material events as soon as they occur.39 Although some self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) require prompt disclosure of material information,
issuers retain some control over the timing, the audience, and the forum
of many important corporate disclosures.4n According to Chairman Lev-
itt, "[t]his practice leads to potential conflicts of interest for analysts and
undermines investor confidence in our markets."4 Regulation FD seeks
to eliminate selective disclosure.
B. Revision or Division: Rule and Definition Compromises
The SEC proposed Regulation FD on December 20, 1999 and pro-
vided a comment period during which the SEC received nearly 6,000
comment letters.42 Over 5,000 of the comments came from individual
investors voicing support for the proposed regulation. n3 Comments from
industry professionals and law firms, while joining in the SEC's concern
about fairness, expressed serious concerns about the practical effects of
the proposed regulation.44
In the proposing release, the SEC cited a recent academic study that
analyzed trading during conference calls.45 The study sampled 1,056
corporate conference calls made by 808 firms from February to Novem-
ber 1995 to determine whether conference calls provide information to
investors and whether other investors have equal access to the informa-
tion provided during conference calls.4 6 The authors relied on observa-
tions that stock price volatility and trading volume increased during
conference calls to conclude that information must be provided during
such calls.4 7 Additionally, the authors concluded that conference calls
do not provide equal access to all investors because the average trade
size increased during conference calls, meaning institutional investors
39. Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11, at Section I, 72,591.
40. Id.
41. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, Open Commission
Meeting on Audit Committee Oversight, Selective Disclosure, and Insider Trading (Dec. 15,
1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/alsdisc.htm. [hereinafter Levitt, Open Commission
Meeting].
42. Supra note 9.
43. Securities and Exchange Commission Comm'r Laura S. Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in
the Information Age: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing, Address Before the Internet
Securities Regulation American Conference Institute (June 26, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speeches/spch387.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2000).
44. Id.
45. Richard Frankel, Maily Johnson, & Douglas J. Skinner, An Emporical Examination of
Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure Medium, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 133 (1999).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 135.
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use the information to trade in real time.48
Although the SEC cites this study as supporting the need for Regu-
lation FD, the conclusions in the study actually undermine the need for
such a regulation. Two organizations have reported that individual
investor access to conference calls has increased significantly since the
1995 date of the study.49 According to a survey by the National Investor
Relations Institute (NIRI) released in August 2000, sixty-one percent of
2,492 companies surveyed already webcast their corporate conference
calls for access by the media and individual investors and another
twenty-two percent planned to webcast their conference calls within the
next year.5°
Thus, prior to Regulation FD, individual investors were increas-
ingly privy to conference call information and could also make a quick
profit or minimize losses by trading in real time.5' With the trend in
conference calls moving toward open access prior to Regulation FD, the
benefit of a rule requiring such access seems minimal while the cost of
ensuring strict compliance and exposure to additional legal liability
seems onerous. Thus, it may be more likely that under Regulation FD
the information discussed in conference calls will be watered-down or
scripted due to the fear of additional liability exposure. Ultimately, Reg-
ulation FD may reduce the usefulness and effectiveness of what was an
increasingly open and valuable medium of disclosure.
The SEC also referenced several news reports claiming analysts
now rely less on independent research and more on access to corporate
insiders. 52 The SEC expressed a conflict of interest concern that is two-
fold: (1) issuers feel compelled to give access and information to ana-
lysts in order to receive favorable ratings; and (2) analysts feel com-
pelled to give issuers favorable ratings to ensure continued access and
receive future business for their firms with the company (i.e. subsequent
offerings).53 While Regulation FD will reduce the pressure companies
48. Id.
49. Securities and Exchange Commission Comm'r Laura S. Unger, Fallout from Regulation
FD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?, Address before the Glasser LegalWorks Conference
on SEC Regulation FD (Oct. 27, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch421.htm.
50. Press Release, National Investor Relations Institute, NIRI Surveys Finds Adoption of
Regulation Full Disclosure Likely to Limit Amount of Information Disclosed to Market
Participants: Survey also finds 61% Now Webcast Conference Calls; Another 22% Planning To
Do So Within the Next Year (Aug. 2000), at http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/
EA080800.cfm.
51. Id. The authors of the study concluded that issuers released information during
conference calls and that those privy to the conference calls could trade on and profit from in real
time. The problem cited was limited access. Since issuers have increasingly opened up access to
individual investors, it follows that individual investors may also profit from conference calls.
52. Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11, at II, 72,592-93 n. 18.
53. Id. at 72,592-93.
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feel regarding access for analysts, there is no reason to believe that ana-
lysts will no longer feel pressure to give issuers favorable ratings in
order to receive future business for their firms.
Ostensibly, the SEC created parity by enacting Regulation FD.
Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth the basic rule regarding selective
disclosure. Broken down into its major elements, this rule requires that
whenever: (1) an issuer, or person acting on its behalf; (2) discloses
material nonpublic information; (3) to certain enumerated persons (in
general, securities market professionals or holders of the issuer's securi-
ties who may well trade on the basis of the information); (4) the issuer
must make public disclosure of that same information: (a) simultane-
ously (for intentional disclosures); or (b) promptly (for non-intentional
disclosures)."
Regulation FD places the "responsibility for avoiding selective dis-
closure and the risks of engaging in it, on the issuer and persons acting
on behalf of the issuer."55 The SEC limited the definition of "person
acting on behalf of an issuer" in Regulation FD's final form to mean: (1)
any senior official of the issuer; or (2) any other officer, employee, or
agent of an issuer who regularly communicates with certain enumerated
persons.56
The SEC did not change the "materiality" standard from the pro-
posed rule. The standard is based on existing case law. Information is
material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important" in making an investment decision.57 To
fulfill the materiality requirement, there must be a substantial likelihood
that the fact "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."58
During the proposal stage of Regulation FD, the least controversial
definition of personnel covered was the "any person" definition, refer-
ring to anyone receiving the material, nonpublic information. The regu-
lation enumerates four categories, three of which are securities market
professionals, and the final category provides a catch-all for any holder
of the issuer's securities who may reasonably trade based on the infor-
54. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2001).
55. Id. See also Richard H. Walker, Director, Securities and Exchange Commission
Enforcement Division, Regulation FD - An Enforcement Perspective, Address before the
Compliance & Legal Division of the Securities and Industry Association (Nov. 1, 2000), at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch415.htm [hereinafter Walker].
56. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2001); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, II(B)(l)(b), 51,720 (2000) [hereinafter Official Comments].
57. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
58. Id.
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mation.59 While these individuals are not the primary targets of Regula-
tion FD, some levels of conduct may give rise to aiding and abetting
liability for violating the regulation.6"
"Nonpublic" refers to information that has not been "disseminated
in a manner making it available to investors generally."'6 The final ver-
sion of Regulation FD allows more flexibility satisfying the "public dis-
closure" element. According to the proposal, an issuer could file a Form
8-K to satisfy the public disclosure requirement, distribute a press
release through a widely disseminated news or wire service, or use any
other non-exclusionary method of disclosure. 6' The final version allows
issuers to file or furnish a Form 8-K, or disseminate "through another
method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the informa-
tion to the public."63 Ironically, although the SEC cites the emergence
of the internet as a reason for the passage of Regulation FD, disclosure
over a corporation's website does not constitute public disclosure.6 4
The SEC recognizes that many disclosure situations require snap
judgment by issuer personnel and made a key concession to concerned
commentators.65 In its final form, Regulation FD applies a recklessness
standard to determine whether a disclosure was intentional.6 6 According
to Rule 101(a), a person acts "intentionally" only if the person knows or
is reckless in not knowing that the information he or she is communicat-
ing is both material and nonpublic. 67
In the event of non-intentional disclosure, public disclosure must be
"prompt." The final version that states the outer boundary of prompt
disclosure as the later of twenty-four hours or the commencement of the
next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange, after a senior offi-
cial learns of the disclosure and knows (or is reckless in not knowing)
that the information disclosed was material and nonpublic.68
Perhaps the most important revision in the eyes of industry profes-
sionals is the exclusion of Regulation FD from the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act. No private cause of action arises from a
violation of Regulation FD.69 Since its goal is to promote more public
59. Official Comments, supra note 56, at 57,719.
60. Walker, supra note 55; see Official Comments, supra note 56, at II(B)(7).
61. Official Comments, supra note 56, at II(B)(2) 51,721.
62. Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11, at II(B)(5), 72,596.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2001).
64. Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11, at II(A), 72,593, II(B)(5)(b), 72,597.
65. Id. at II(B)(2), 72,594.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2001).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2001).
69. 17 C.F.R. §243.102 (2001).
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disclosure, a violation does not affect Exchange Act reporting status
either.7°
These changes to Regulation ED reflected more than the mere con-
cerns voiced by industry professionals in the comment period. This
Regulation almost divided the SEC. In a speech before the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Commissioner Isaac Hunt expressed
his reservations that Regulation FD as proposed, "would be extremely
costly to corporations and provide little benefit to investors."'" Without
some of the changes explained above, Commissioner Hunt may have
sided with Commissioner Unger and rejected Regulation FD.
III. THE SEC OVERSTATED THE NEED FOR REGULATION FD
A. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH)
The changes implemented in the adopted version of Regulation FD
reduced the cost to issuers, but did not provide any further benefit to
investors compared to the proposal. Thus, Commissioner Hunt's asser-
tion that the proposed rule would provide little benefit to investors also
applies to the final rule.72 His skepticism concerning the beneficial
effect of the regulation on investors may reveal an appreciation for Effi-
cient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH).
The ECMH asserts that the price of a security reflects all relevant
information available in the market about that security and changes
instantaneously with any release of new, relevant market information. 73
The semi-strong form of the ECMH posits that current market prices
reflect all publicly available information. 74 More specifically: one can-
not profitably trade on the basis of public information. The Supreme
Court adopted this form of the ECMH as the most appropriate model for
the existing market.75
The ECMH does, however, have some flaws. Even though the
speed of today's markets provides for a very rapid adjustment to reflect
all publicly available information, the change is not instantaneous.
Therefore, absent selective disclosure, the ability to profit from new
70. 17 C.F.R. §243.103 (2001).
71. Securities and Exchange Commission Comm'r Isaac C. Hunt Jr., Remarks at the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries (June 30, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch388.htm.
72. Id.
73. Paul P. Brountas Jr., Note, Rule lOb-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities
Analysts, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1534 (1992).
74. Id. The ECMH assumes that stocks are heavily traded and its assertions do not apply to
thinly-traded stocks. Thus, the lack of trading activity in some stocks may provide lag time
between the release of information and the reflection of such information in the stock price.
75. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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information still exists. The window of opportunity, however, is short-
ened. Not surprisingly, industry professionals are better poised to act
immediately upon receipt of new information than individual investors.
This ability to react quicker minimizes the possible benefit to individual
investors derived from the elimination of selective disclosure.
B. The Conflicts of Interest Raised by the SEC May Satisfy the
Dirks Personal Benefit Test
Recall that the SEC has a two-fold conflict of interest concern: (1)
issuers feel compelled to give access and information to analysts in
order to receive favorable ratings; and (2) analysts feel compelled to
give favorable ratings to issuers in order to ensure continued access and
receive future business for their firms with the company (i.e. subsequent
offerings).7 6 If the SEC discovered such conduct, the test articulated in
Dirks provides the necessary vehicle.77 The Dirks Court explained
objective facts and circumstances that suggest quid pro quo would sat-
isfy the personal benefit test.78 An issuer who revealed material non-
public information to an analyst in return for a "buy" rating, in effect
sold the information. This is the scenario the SEC intimates when justi-
fying the need for Regulation FD. That scenario, however, is clearly
covered under the Dirks "personal benefit. ' 79 Therefore, Regulation FD
does not solve any problems arising from the Dirks decision and
imposes unnecessary burdens upon issuers.
C. Regulation FD Casts Too Wide A Net8"
An issuer may be wary of dealing with a recently-investigated ana-
lyst. Also, an issuer that just had a disclosure investigated may be
unwilling to talk to analysts for fear of another investigation, even if the
prior investigation did not result in a violation. Although the regulation
is intended to bolster investors' confidence in the markets, the SEC may
actually undermine issuer confidence in analysts, analyst confidence in
issuers, and ultimately investor confidence in both.
In the words of Commissioner Unger, who voted against the regu-
lation, "Regulation FD turns on its head the longstanding relationship
between issuers and their analysts - a liaison that has never been particu-
larly easy."8' She even referred to the Second Circuit's comparison of
76. Walker, supra note 55.
77. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
78. Id. at 663-64 n.15.
79. Id.
80. See Unger, supra note 49.
81. Id.
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the corporate official/analyst exchange as a "fencing match conducted
on a tightrope," by asking if the SEC has finally cut the tightrope.82 The
considerable uncertainty between what constitutes immaterial informa-
tion that completes a mosaic and what information is material creates a
pitfall for issuers and analysts alike.
IV. POSSIBLE TRAPS AND PITFALLS IN THE FINAL RULE
A. The SEC's Calming Campaign
Some readers may wonder why Regulation FD caused such alarm
on Wall Street and drove law firms to send out numerous client letters
warning them of the dangers of the regulation.83 Securities professionals
and law firms saw so many traps and pitfalls for issuers that the SEC
began a calming campaign to ease their fears. The SEC issued several
interpretive guidelines and sent commissioners and staff around the
nation to speak to nervous securities professionals.
Perhaps the most insightful speech of this campaign came from
Richard Walker, the SEC's Director of Enforcement.84 Walker spoke to
the Compliance and Legal Division of the Securities Industry Associa-
tion (SIA), giving the Enforcement Division's perspective on Regulation
FD.85 He began with an imaginary conversation between an analyst and
brokerage firm's compliance officer. In the "conversation," the compli-
ance officer was too afraid to give the analyst his first name without first
having his lawyers advise him whether such disclosure would violate
Regulation FD.86 "Regulation FD was not designed as a trap for the
unwary, as many law firms are counseling. In fact, the Commission
took a number of steps in revising the final rule for the specific purpose
of disarming many potential traps."87 Walker explained that Regulation
FD is not a fraud rule and creates no private liability. He further
explained that the standard for a violation is recklessness, and issuers are
not responsible for selective disclosures made by mid-level management
and junior employees.88 He added that aggressive enforcement of Regu-
lation FD would "frustrate the purpose of the rule - which is to promote
broader and fairer disclosure of information to investors - by second-
guessing reasonable disclosure decisions made in good faith, even if we
don't agree with them."89
82. Id. (referring to SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 556 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977)).








SEC'S REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE
After attempting to allay the Securities Industry Association's
fears, Walker then reminded his audience "the Enforcement Division is
not a toothless tiger."9 He warned the SIA's Compliance and Legal
Division that the Enforcement Division will be on the lookout for two
types of violations. 91 Egregious violations involving intentional or reck-
less disclosure of information that is unquestionably material will cer-
tainly warrant enforcement action.92 Such violations include selectively
disclosing mergers, earnings, or other matters that courts have long held
to be material. 93 Attempts to defraud the system will also be pursued.94
These violations include a pattern of purportedly non-intentional disclo-
sures that steps over the line or providing indirect guidance to select
audiences through winks, nods, or other coded responses.9 Enforcing
these types of violations seems reasonable and aimed at protecting indi-
vidual investors. Issuers can hardly claim to be caught by traps or pit-
falls when conduct rises to this level.
Walker's speech also touched some controversial aspects of Regu-
lation FD that left an air of uncertainty. For example, Regulation FD
clearly prohibits the common practice of "walking the Street" up or
down.96 "Walking the Street" is when issuers inform analysts that an
earnings forecast is too low or too high under current conditions. 97
What is not so clear is when issuers may confirm prior guidance.98
Walker referred to a recent release by the SEC's Division of Corpo-
ration Finance addressing this topic and several other Regulation FD
concerns.9 9 Regulation FD does not necessarily prohibit confirmation,
but it does make confirmation relatively pointless. If an analyst calls an
issuer the day after disclosure, confirmation would usually be permitted.
If an analyst calls mid-quarter, however, confirmation may violate Reg-
ulation FD. 0 The Division of Corporation Finance explains that if con-
firmation would be "material," then the confirmation would violate
Regulation FD.201









98. Fourth Supplement: Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Division of
Corporation Finance, No. 1 (Dec. 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/offices/corpfin/phonits4.htm.
99. See id. Walker, supra note 55.
100. Supra note 98, at No. 1.
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intervening events, the amount of time that has elapsed since public dis-
closure, and where the issuer is in the earnings cycle."°' It is easy to
envision many close scenarios, but according to Walker, those scenarios
would not be investigated due to the recklessness standard and the
SEC's desire not to thwart the purpose of its own regulation by overzeal-
ous enforcement. 10
3
B. Material versus Mosaic
Walker moves onto thin ice, however, as he discusses what is
referred to as "mosaic information."' 04 In the adopting release, the SEC
specifically stated:
[A]n issuer cannot render material information immaterial simply by
breaking it into ostensibly non-material pieces. At the same time, an
issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of infor-
mation to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece
helps the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information that, taken
together, is material. Similarly, since materiality is an objective test
keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation FD will not be impli-
cated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose signifi-
cance is discerned by the analyst. Analysts can provide a valuable
service in sifting through and extracting information that would not
be significant to the ordinary investor to reach material conclusions.
We do not intend, by Regulation FD, to discourage this sort of activ-
ity. The focus of Regulation FD is on whether the issuer discloses
material nonpublic information, not on whether an analyst, through
some combination of persistence, knowledge, and insight, regards as
material information whose significance is not apparent to the reason-
able investor. '05
In the Regulation FD context, a violation depends on the issuer's
knowledge that the information he provides will complete the mosaic. If
the issuer knowingly provides information that completes an analyst's
mosaic, that information would then fall under the caution that comple-
tion of the mosaic must be "unbeknownst to the issuer."'0 6 Alterna-
tively, the SEC could assert that the issuer actually attempted to render
material information immaterial by breaking it into seemingly non-mate-
rial pieces. 107
Despite all the analyst's legitimate labor and research providing the
majority of the picture, the issuer could run afoul of Regulation FD if
102. Id.
103. Walker, supra note 55.
104. Id.
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one of the issuer's FD-covered personnel knowingly provides the last
immaterial piece of the puzzle. The requirement that a company must
unknowingly provide the immaterial information completing a mosaic is
not supported by case law. As a result, attempts to pursue this approach
may encounter courts hostile to the alteration. 08 In application and
enforcement, the SEC may not pursue such a situation, but the possibil-
ity of facing an enforcement action due to an analyst's diligent research
and the issuer's attempt to attract a new investor may be enough to sig-
nificantly hinder the efforts of both parties.
Walker unintentionally provides an example in his speech. He ref-
erenced the popular Janus Mutual Fund commercial where Janus boasts
that its analysts investigated a fire prevention system used by a computer
company in which Janus considered investing. 09 A traditional sprinkler
system would put out a fire but damage the computers in the process.
Janus analysts discovered this company employed a dry fire prevention
system that would not damage the computers." I 0 According to Walker,
Regulation FD will reward this kind of diligence. "That commercial is
about mosaic information, pure and simple.""' The specific language
of the adopting release, however, does not draw such a clear line." 2
Both the Janus commercial and Walker's reference to it lead inves-
tors to believe the analysts found out about this fire-prevention system
unbeknownst to the issuer. What if the issuer, in an attempt to show
management forethought and attract Janus as an investor, specifically
pointed this fire-prevention system out to the analysts during a tour of
the facilities? Janus and Walker portray that information about the sys-
tem as essential to the overall determination by the analysts - the final
piece of the mosaic. When information completes the mosaic and the
issuer knows that providing such specific information to the analyst
would influence an investment decision, would it not also be important
information for a reasonable investor to make an investment decision?
If so, it is an intentionally selective disclosure of material, nonpublic
information. Walker's own example of model diligence and mosaic
information would violate Regulation FD.
108. A skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly
inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which reveals material non-
public information. Whenever managers and analysts meet elsewhere than in public, there is a
risk that the analyst will emerge with knowledge of material information which is not publicly
available. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). The Elkind case first
articulated the mosaic theory. Based on the quotation above, the mosaic theory does not require
the analyst receive the inconsequential data unbeknownst to the issuer.
109. Walker, supra note 55.
110. Id.
11l. Id.
112. Official Comments, supra note 56, at II(B)(2), 51,724.
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Applying the example's facts to Regulation FD's analysis would
look-like this: (1) the computer company; (2) revealed a unique fire-
prevention system (material because issuer knowingly provided infor-
mation that completed the mosaic) during a tour of the facility; (3) to the
analysts; (4) intentionally without making simultaneous public disclo-
sure. Thus, if the issuer pointed out the fire-prevention system to the
analysts knowing it would complete the mosaic, the issuer violated Reg-
ulation FD. Conversely, if the issuer intentionally provided the same
information without knowing it completed the mosaic, the information
would not be deemed material. Since the information would not be
material, the issuer would not violate Regulation FD.
The SEC, however, may not believe a reasonable investor would
have even considered whether the company had a fire suppression sys-
tem before making an investment decision. If so, the information would
not be material. It could be considered under the theory that material
information was broken into seemingly immaterial pieces. "[S]ince
materiality is keyed to the reasonable investor, Regulation FD will not
be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose
significance is discerned by the analyst."' 13 Notice that the preceding
statement by Walker in discussing Janus's commercial, does not refer-
ence whether the issuer knowingly provided this information to the ana-
lysts. Under the limited facts in Walker's version of the Janus example,
the issuer would most likely not be in violation of Regulation FD.
Given the additional facts in the modified hypothetical, however, the
issuer's intent in pointing out the fire protection system is designed to
influence the analyst's decision. Would there be a violation? Is the
information still immaterial because the analysts are more sophisticated
than an ordinary investor? If you ask an investor whether he would
want to know this information, the investor will almost certainly say
such information would be important in his decision.
C. The Hindsight Problem
This example points out the problem of hindsight in Regulation FD
investigations. If the computer company in the Janus example exper-
iences considerable stock price gains within a short period of time, infor-
mation that might have been viewed as immaterial may in hindsight be
viewed as material (and nonpublic since not every investor gets to tour
the facility). The hindsight problem stems both from the standpoint of
the reasonable/ordinary investor standard used for materiality purposes
and in the recklessness standard applied to the issuer's conduct.
113. Id.
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Given the reports cited in the SEC's proposing release of Regula-
tion FD, the SEC appears to believe that analysts and corporate officials
are too cozy and analysts rely more on access to corporate insiders than
on genuine analysis."' If the SEC has adopted this skeptical view of the
efforts of analysts, why then would the SEC even believe that the Janus
analysts actually based their decision on diligent research? Did not the
company really just tell them some secret information and the analysts
claimed the fire prevention system helped complete their "mosaic?"' 5
Obviously, earnings estimates and fire-prevention systems are dif-
ferent types of information. Regardless, material information is material
information and a rise in stock price may attract the attention of the
Enforcement Division, especially when closely correlated in time to a
major market participant, like Janus, investing in the company. Basi-
cally, this ambiguity allows for significant after-the-fact speculation
about what really happened when the issuer met the analyst.
The SEC is a respected agency and has a track record of exercising
restraint, but it should be remembered that "the Enforcement Division is
not a toothless tiger.""' 6 The recklessness standard should prevent the
institution of penalties in such a situation, but it gives the Enforcement
Division a vehicle to go on a "fishing expedition" and Regulation FD
may provide plaintiff lawyers with a roadmap for private enforcement
efforts.' " Although the SEC stated that a Regulation FD violation is not
deemed a violation of the antifraud provisions, courts ultimately deter-
mine the scope of lOb-5 liability and may hold otherwise. ' 8
V. POTENTIAL EFFECTS AND COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The SEC must have seen a compelling need for Regulation FD for
the SEC to pass a regulation that casts such a wide net and that may
have considerable impact on market confidence. The SEC only refer-
ences a few academic studies and news reports, however, in the propos-
ing release.' During the comment period, many securities industry
114. Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11, at 72,591.
115. If this type of second-guessing seems unlikely, refer back to the Economist article
discussing Morgan Stanley's restricted meeting contained in the introduction. Farewell, Fair
disclosure?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 73.
116. Walker, supra note 55.
117. Michael G. Lange, & Chauncey D. Steele IV, The Probable Effects of Regulation FD on
Private Securities Litigation, 11 SEc. NEWS 1, 11 (Winter 2001) [hereinafter Lange & Steele].
118. "[T]his deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute,
as revealed by its language, purpose, and history. On a number of occasions in recent years this
Court has found it necessary to reject the SEC's interpretation of various provisions of the
Securities Acts." IBT v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (discussing court deference to SEC
interpretations).
119. See Proposing Release Comments, supra note 11.
2002]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
professionals argued that the SEC had not demonstrated a need for this
regulation. 20 The SEC did not hold any hearings or embark on any
fact-finding expeditions. 2 ' The SEC did not even suggest a Blue Rib-
bon panel to determine best practices.' 22
Despite the lack of procedural safeguards and evidence demonstrat-
ing a need for Regulation FD, Chairman Levitt said selective disclosure
is an "all-too-common" and "insidious" practice.'23 In fact, the National
Investor Relations Institute provides a different picture of the need for
this regulation. 12 4 NIRI's August 2000 survey demonstrates that public
companies have already started using the internet to provide greater
access to the individual investor. 25 In spite of this evidence, calls from
securities professionals for alternative measures, the possibility of nega-
tive effects on the market, and an overall lack of evidence presented in
support of the need for Regulation FD, the SEC adopted the regulation
on August 10, 2000.126
Many questions linger regarding material versus mosaic, hindsight
judgments, intentional versus nonintentional, and many other areas of
Regulation FD. The question that remains is how will those lingering
questions affect issuers, analysts, and investors? If issuers can no longer
"walk the Street" up or down regarding earnings estimates, the market
will see issuers miss analyst estimates more often and by a wider mar-
gin. 12 7 When companies miss analyst estimates, their stock prices fall
drastically. 128
Even before Regulation FD took effect, its impact started to hit the
market.129 Bulldog Research, a firm that tracks analyst performance on
estimates and recommendations issued a survey in the end of 2000.' It
reflects a 5.3% decrease in analyst accuracy from second-quarter 2000
120. Id.; see also Regulation FD, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881 (Aug. 24, 2000).
121. Letter from Cleary, Gotlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Comment on File No. 7-31-99, Proposed
Regulation FD and Selective Disclosure Comment Letter, to Securities Exchange Commission,
(Apr. 28, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7319 9 /clearyl.htm.
122. Id.
123. Levitt, Open Commission Meeting, supra note 41.
124. Press Release, National Investor Relations Institute, NIRI Surveys Finds Adoption of
Regulation Full Disclosure Likely to Limit Amount of Information Disclosed to Market
Participants: Survey also finds 61% Now Webcast Conference Calls; Another 22% Planning To
Do So Within the Next Year (Aug. 2000), at http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/
EA080800.cfm.
125. Id.
126. Levitt, Open Commission Meeting, supra note 39.
127. See Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Low, Analysts' Earnings Estimates Are
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earnings to third-quarter 2000 earnings. 3 ' Additionally, "flash esti-
mates" - estimates changed by analysts in the four weeks before earn-
ings are announced - grew more dispersed by 13.67%.32 Bulldog
Research's Co-President, Mike Thompson believes Regulation FD is
behind this notable change. 133 The study covered the time period after
adoption but before the effective date of Regulation FD. 134 It seems that
even in anticipation of the regulation, analyst estimates diverged from
each other and the accuracy of estimates decreased. 35
Most of the comment letters opposing Regulation FD predicted a
"chilling" effect on corporate communications. 36 It seems, however,
that companies are disclosing more information and at a quicker pace.137
This rapid-fire disclosure also has its drawbacks because the market will
often react before analysts or individual investors have time to assess
what the disclosure really means for the company and its prospects for
success.
At first blush the statement that Regulation FD will increase vola-
tility may not seem to square with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothe-
sis. As stated earlier, however, the hypothesis is imperfect and there is a
window (albeit very narrow) before all public information is accurately
reflected in the stock price. The effect of Regulation FD will be to
amplify the volatility in stock prices during that very narrow window.
Thus, a stock will experience higher highs and lower lows before adjust-
ing to the price equilibrium.
Naturally, those who trade quickest have an opportunity to profit,
but others will lose out. Regulation FD does not take away from market
professionals the institutional edge to react quicker to or trade quicker
on market information than individual investors. Individual investors
may have access to the information, but will not be able to act on it
before the price adjusts. It did not take long for a few victims to emerge
in the post Regulation FD world. Intel and Gateway are two examples.
One day after Intel announced lower than expected third-quarter
revenue, its stock price fell twenty-two percent. 38 Even more stunning
was Gateway's late announcement that the computer manufacturer
131. Id.
132. Id. The "dispersion" referred to in the flash estimate study indicates the variance among
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would miss earnings forecasts by forty percent. 39 Gateway's stock
price dropped a staggering thirty-six percent.' 40  Gateway's incident
occurred just nine days after its chief financial officer reassured inves-
tors that Gateway was confident with consensus earnings per-share esti-
mates; a response to counter sliding stock prices after an analyst
downgraded Gateway's stock.' 4 1 An analyst who follows Gateway for
ING Barings, Rob Cihra, suspects Regulation FD may be prompting
companies to disclose bad news sooner.42
Volatility continued into the fourth-quarter of 2000 with earnings
warnings sending the major averages careening lower. 143 According to
Chuck Hill, research director for First Call/Thomson Financial, the
recent surge in profit downgrades by companies and the analysts who
track them has been both sudden and severe. 144 Fourth quarter 2000
pre-announcements jumped fifty-eight percent over the previous year. 145
Hill ascribed part of this increase to Regulation FD, which he says has
led companies with market-moving earnings news to disclose it more
quickly than in the past. 146 "I'd advise people to buckle their seat belts
... because they could be in for a wild time," said Hill regarding fourth-
quarter earnings. 147 While Regulation FD cannot be blamed for what
seems to be a slowing down of the economy, it certainly seems to have
contributed to the decline. While numerous factors unrelated to Regula-
tion FD affect earnings, the effect of the regulation is likely reflected in
the spread between analyst estimates and reported earnings. This is
because companies can no longer "walk the Street down."' 48
Another troubling effect of Regulation FD is the cost incurred by
issuers to ensure compliance. The SEC predicted a per year total cost of
approximately $34,937,500 to $49,562,500 in the adopting release. 49
Other organizations, however, have estimated costs far exceeding the
FD: Has the SEC Finally Cut the Tightrope?, Address before the Glasser LegalWorks Conference
on SEC Regulation FD (Oct. 27, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch421.htm.
139. Greg lp, Stocks Pay Price for Firms' Excessive Optimism: More Profit Reversal Could
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SEC's estimates. For example, the Securities Industry Association
expects issuer costs to total $297 million. 5' SIA attributed $87 million
dollars of that estimate to the one-time cost of creating Regulation FD-
related procedures and the remaining $210 million for Year-One costs of
determining the materiality of and disseminating information.
15
'
Perhaps the most expensive Regulation FD-related cost may come
from private securities litigation. Despite the SEC's express statement
that a Regulation FD violation is not deemed a violation of the antifraud
provisions, plaintiff lawyers are already developing Regulation FD-
related theories for antifraud liability. Some plaintiff lawyers have
stated that the SEC, whether intentionally or not, provided a roadmap for
private enforcement efforts in the related regulation commentary.1 52 In
attempts to comply with Regulation FD, issuers will most likely list
whatever information the company believes to be material. Although
the company may err on the side of caution by including information it
may not necessarily believe is material, plaintiffs' lawyers may use the
internal lists and policies in order to have the information deemed mate-
rial. 53 Additionally, many issuers have stated in 8-K filings that the
disclosure is made pursuant to Regulation FD. Some lawyers will argue
that if the disclosure was made pursuant to Regulation FD, then it must
be material.1 54 Another likely vehicle for private actions is a share-
holder derivative suit alleging management was negligent in implement-
ing and enforcing the company's obligations under Regulation FD as
well as internal company policies. 55 In addition, an issuer's contacts
with analysts may lead to liability under the "entanglement" or "adop-
tion" theories.' 56 Finally, disclosures made under Regulation FD are
still subject to Rule lOb-5 liability. "57 If predictions concerning stock
price volatility hold true, then Regulation FD may not only provide for
more private causes of action, but also support higher damage calcula-
tions. 58 The possibility of increased private actions due to Regulation
costs for creating Regulation FD-related procedures. Official Comments, supra note 56, at
V(A)(2).
150. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATION FAIR
DISCLOSURE 14 (May 2001). According to SIA, these calculations are based on the 7,906 issuers
listed on exchanges with the volume and cost data culled from interviews with twenty-five general
counsel, SEC filing data, Thomson First Call data, and discussions with multiple web-casting
vendors and Investor Relations professionals [hereinafter SIA, CosTs AND BENEFITS OF FD].
151. Id.
152. Lange & Steele, supra note 117, at 11.
153. Id. at 18.
154. Id. at 17-18.
155. Id. at 16.
156. Id. at 15.
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158. Id. at 19.
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FD is real and significant.
With such extensive costs or potential costs, what benefits do the
regulation provide that tip the cost/benefit scale to the side of adopting
the regulation? It seems the most touted benefit is a perceived leveling
of the playing field. This benefit, however, will likely prove illusory or
mask a negative consequence considering the large number of investors
that rely on brokers and the 88 million investors who own equity mutual
funds. "'59 The fact that so many individual investors rely on institutions
undermines the arguments that selective disclosure adversely affects
individual investors. Actually, these investors may ultimately bear the
brunt of any negative consequences to the extent that brokers and fund
managers rely on the research and recommendations produced by sell-
side analysts. 160
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC passed Regulation FD because it believed selective dis-
closure undermined investor confidence in the market. Is the cure worse
than the disease? It is still too early to tell because the side effects of the
regulation may be amplified in the short term by knee-jerk reactions.
This rule, intended to ensure investor confidence in the market,
could fundamentally alter the relationships in and the functions of the
market. By placing its regulatory priority on parity of information rather
than efficiency of the market, the SEC may actually undermine investor
confidence in the market due to increased volatility and reduced quality
of disclosed information. In truth, only time will tell. Enough concerns
were raised about the regulation and enough alternatives suggested,
however, that the SEC should have exhausted other means before adopt-
ing such a far-reaching regulation.
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